Abstract-Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) tightly integrate cyber and physical components and transcend discrete and continuous domains. It is greatly desired that the physical components being controlled and the software implementation of control algorithms can be verified together. We present an efficient approach to reachability analysis of Hybrid Automata Pushdown System (HAPS ) models for cyber/physical co-verification of CPS. We have realized this approach and applied it to real-world control systems. The evaluation has shown that HAPS is an effective model for co-verification of CPS and our approach has major potential in verifying systemlevel properties of CPS, therefore improving the reliability of CPS.
I. Introduction Cyber-Physical Systems (CPS) [1] are physical and engineered systems whose operations are integrated, monitored, and controlled by embedded computational cores. CPS tightly integrate discrete cyber components and continuous physical components. These two types of components cooperatively deliver system functionalities and jointly contribute to system-level properties. CPS engineering must account for the interacting and interdependent behaviors of both types of components. As a consequence, formal verification of correctness properties is a key step in guaranteeing safety of many important CPS such as medical devices, automobiles, robotics, avionics and other critical infrastructures.
Recently, there has been extensive research on formal verification of CPS, including [2] , [3] , [4] and many others. The focus of these approaches has mainly been on correctness of high-level control algorithm designs. CPS are often modeled as hybrid automata [5] , which combines automaton transitions for capturing discrete changes with differential equations for continuous changes. Well-known tools for verifying such systems include iSat [6] , HyTech [7] and Uppaal [8] . However, existing tools have focused on high-level mathematical models and largely ignored the implementation aspects of controllers. In such a situation, a number of simplifying assumptions have been made when modeling controllers. There are two major issues:
Firstly, control engineers often overlook numerically unstable implementations. For example, Fig. 1 illustrates the C language implementation of an algorithm [9] that first computes the function x = (c 1 b 2 − c 2 b 1 )/(a 1 b 2 − a 2 b 1 ) (a 1 , a 2 , b 1 , b 2 , c 1 , c 2 ∈ R), and returns 1 i f f x is nonnegative; otherwise return 0. For the input a1 = 37639840, a2 = 29180479, b1 = −46099201, b2 = −35738642, c1 = 0, and c2 = 1, the computation of x should be −46099201 by the algorithm. However, the program computes the value x = 0.343466 on a PC running Linux using the gcc compiler. Since x determines the output of the function Control Test, which may lead to a downstream choice of a different controller being activated, such an unstable computation may result in compromised safety of systems.
1 /* ****************************************** 2 *Output: return 1 if x is non -negative; 3 * otherwise 0. 4 ******************************************* */ 5 int Control_Test(float a1 , float a2 , float b1 , float b2 , float c1 , float c2) 6 { 7
... 8 float x = (c1*b2 -c2*b1)/(a1*b2 -a2*b1); 9
if (x > 0.0) return 1; 10 else return 0; 11 } Figure 1 : An example of unstable software implementation.
Secondly, software engineers often ignore key features of control system design goals. When designing controllers, the control engineers explicitly consider key features of control systems, such as robustness. The field of feedback control is mature enough to answer many questions in controller design based on efficient algorithms and tools. Once a control system has been designed and verified, software engineers implement the controller. However, it is not clear if these design goals are maintained on the software implementation level. It is often unknown whether the software controller is safe or not with slight perturbations in the inputs and outputs to the system. Input values of the controller with slight perturbations when sampling can execute entirely different code paths and can potentially produce very different outputs.
In this paper, we present a cyber/physical co-verification approach to ensure high confidence of CPS. The foundation of this approach is a Hybrid Automata Pushdown System as a unifying model for cyber/physical co-verification. Coverification, verifying software and physical components (or plants) together, is essential to establishing the correctness of a complete system. It takes into account both the numerical implementations and key features of control system design. We construct co-verification model in a C program and verify the C program through symbolic execution. Our reachability analysis checks whether a system is safe or not in all the paths of the systems within a bounded step k.
One major challenge in co-verification is the integration of software and plant representations within the same formal model. Software and plant verification utilize different models. For verification of software implementations, one of the most popular models is pushdown systems whose semantics closely resemble the semantics of software programs. Plants in CPS operate in a time continuum, typically medelled as hybrid automata. However, for co-verification, it is not desired to model both software and plant as pushdown systems or hybrid automata (see section III). This paper makes the following contributions:
• Co-verification model. We designed a formal coverification model, Hybrid Automata Pushdown System (HAPS ), to capture software and plant designs, as well as their concurrent executions and interactions. The core contribution is our process for constructing a HAPS by synchronizing a pushdown system that abstracts software and a hybrid automata that abstracts plant.
• Model checking of HAPS . We developed a method for checking safety properties of a HAPS . We verify these properties of a HAPS through reachability analysis based on symbolic execution. Safety properties are desired correlations among software and plant events. Events in CPS are basically boolean propositions over cyber and physical variables. We have implemented our approach and successfully applied it to co-verification of real-world control systems. Preliminary evaluation has shown that HAPS is an effective model for cyber/physical co-verification and our approach has major potential in improving reliability of CPS.
The rest of this paper is organized as follows. Section II discusses the related work. Section III introduces the background of this work. Section IV presents our co-verification model. Section V describe how to construct a HAPS . Section VI discuss how to conduct reachability analysis on a HAPS . Section VII elaborates on application of our approach to real-world systems. Section VIII concludes the paper and discusses future work.
II. Related Work
The CPS concept transcends embedded systems and hybrid systems. Embedded systems research has been largely focused on hardware and software and, particularly, their interactions. Hybrid systems research has been largely focused on the interactions between discrete and continuous domains on high level. CPS research takes a comprehensive view of the system, instead of focusing on a single semantic gap, focuses on multiple semantic gaps simultaneously.
In embedded systems research, various formal languages have been proposed for specifying embedded systems, e.g., Co-design Finite State Machines (CFSMs) [10] , and petrinet based languages such as PRES [11] . However, they do not consider physical dynamics. In [12] , a static analysis tool FLUCTUAT was presented, which applied affine arithmetic to reason about the precision of floating point C code. It has successfully been used on small, but numerically important, parts of embedded controllers and has been able to identify numerically unstable computations. However, this work only focused on discrete computing without considering physical dynamics in verification.
Hybrid systems are modeled as hybrid automata, which combines automaton transitions for capturing discrete changes with differential equations for continuous changes. Well-known tools for verifying hybrid systems include HyTech [7] and Uppaal [8] . For analysis of hybrid systems, it is often useful to abstract a system in a way that preserves the properties being analyzed while hiding the irrelevant details. There has been much research on abstracting hybrid systems, largely categorized into equivalent abstractions and sufficient abstractions. Equivalent abstractions (surveyed in [13] ) such as language-preserving or bi-simulation abstractions of timed automata, rectangular automata, and ominimal hybrid automata have enabled the basic algorithms of tools such as HyTech and Uppaal.
There is an emerging trend in verification of hybrid systems to utilize abstractions based on Satisfiability Modulo Theories (SMT) [14] . In [6] , they used an interval-based solver for ordinary differential equations (ODEs) under an SMT framework. In [15] , a framework for verifying hybrid systems is developed, under which it is proven that the decision problem for bounded logic formulas over the real numbers with general nonlinear functions are decidable. This approach has a key drawback: The focus has been on control logic design on high level with simplifying assumptions.
III. Background
This section introduces the background of our research. First, we analyze timing parameters of control tasks. Then, we review the fundamentals of Pushdown System and Hybrid Automata. Finally, we introduce our case studies.
A. Timing Parameters of Control Task
The basic timing parameters of a control task [16] are shown in Fig. 2 . It is assumed that the control task is released periodically at times given by t k = T * k, where T is the fixed sampling interval of the controller and k is the number of controller iterations. Let t i and t o represent the A/D and D/A conversion periodical instants, respectively. Due to preemption and blocking from other tasks in the OS, the actual start of the task may be delayed for some time L s . This is called the sampling latency of the controller. A dynamic scheduling policy will introduce variations in this interval. The sampling jitter is defined by the range between the minimum and maximum sampling latencies in all task 
We also assume that 
B. Pushdown System as Software Models
A Pushdown System PDS [17] is a tuple (G, Γ, Δ, g 0 , ω 0 ), where G is a finite set of global states, Γ is a finite stack alphabet,
is a finite set of transition rules, and g 0 , ω 0 is the initial configuration. A configuration of PDS is a pair g, ω representing a software state, where g ∈ G is a global state and ω ∈ Γ * is a stack content. An PDS rule is written as g, ω → g , ω , where ((g, γ), (g , ω)) ∈ Δ, and (g, γ) is referred to as the head of this rule. The set of all configurations is denoted as Con f (P).
C. Hybrid Automata as Plant Models
A Hybrid Automata HA [4] is syntactically a tuple (x,x 0 , V, v 0 , inv, di f, E, act, lab, syn), consisting of the following components:
n is called a data state of HA;
•x 0 is the initial data state;
• V is a set of locations, where different control laws apply. A state of hybrid automaton HA is denoted as (v,s), where v ∈ V ands ∈ R n is a data state;
• v 0 is the initial location;
• inv is the location invariants, a labeling function that assigns each location v ∈ V a set of inequalities overx; • di f is the continuous activities, a function that assigns each location v ∈ V a set of inequalities overx andx;
• E is the set of events: edges between locations. Formally, E V × V; • act is the discrete actions, a labeling function assigns to each event e = (v, v ) ∈ E a set of inequalities over x andx , wherex = x 1 , x 2 , ..., x n refers to the new value ofx after event e. The event e = (v, v ) is enabled only when the value ofx in v satisfies act(e); • lab is a set of synchronization labels. The set lab is called the alphabet of HA; • syn is the labeling function that assigns to each event e ∈ E a set of synchronization labels from lab.
D. TableSat
TableSat, as shown in Fig. 3 , is an interactive platform from the University of Michigan, which emulates in 1-degree-of-freedom the dynamics, sensing, and actuation capabilities required for satellite attitude control. TableSat is driven by two computer fans and experiences extremely low friction on its central pivot point. It contains a high-precision rate gyro to measure angular velocity. An onboard Diamond Systems Prometheus PC/104 computer communicates to a ground station via a wireless 802.11b interface. The computer interfaces to sensors through 16-bit analog-to-digital converters and to actuators through amplified 16-bit digital-to-analog channels. The equations of TableSat motion are:
where I is the TableSat moment of inertia, ω is the TableSat angular velocity, v is the speed of the fan, l is the fan moment arm, f T S is the TableSat friction and is a function of ω, K ω f is the fan speed to force constant, V is the voltage applied to the fan, α is the fan time constant, K vω is the fan voltage to change in speed constant, and f f an is the friction in the fans and is function of v.
The controller manipulates the voltage applied to the fan to enforce a target angular velocity of TableSat. Here we set two voltage (0V and 12V) options for the controller to choose. The motion law of TableSat is denoted by the two different voltages: one is 12V voltage applied to the fans (see Eq. 3), the other is 0V voltage applied to the fans (see Eq. 4). Fig. 4 shows the motion of TableSat by hybrid automata. The model consists of 6 discrete locations corresponding to each node, 3-dimensional continuous statesx = (ω, v, t) ∈ R 3 , and 8 discrete state transitions corresponding to the edges. Let t represents the internal timer. According to analysis in section III-A, each motion law is divided into three stages in a loop: sampling, input-output and rest (represent by (t k , t i ], (t i , t o ] and (t o , t k+1 ], respectively). So TableSat has 6 discrete locations (12V dynamic: On AD, On DA and On Rest; 0V dynamic: Off AD, Off DA and Off Rest). Each discrete transition is enabled by its guard condition. For example, a discrete transition d from On DA to On Rest has a guard condition t > t o ∩ On (e =(On DA, On Rest),x act(e) = t > t o , On ∈ lab). When the controller sends command to the fan (i.e., when boolean variable, On or Off, is set to true), the motion of TableSat switches to the corresponding motion law. An edge entering On AD represents the initial constraint. The set of initial state is (On AD, 0, 0, 0). 
IV. Verification Model for Cyber-Physical System
Since software and physical plant are designed in different approaches, they are commonly represented by different formal models. Having separate formal models for software and physical plant is cumbersome for co-verification. A unifying model that combines the merits of Pushdown System and Hybrid Automata is desired so that software, physical plant and their interactions can be analyzed together as an integrated system.
We synthesize a HAPS by synchronizing a Pushdown System and a Hybrid Automata. HAPS captures both the synchronous transitions and asynchronous transitions on the system level. While PDS is a suitable model for programs, it is not designed to accept any inputs. In co-verification, physical plant behaviors also affect software executions, e.g., through sampling; therefore, the PDS software model should be extended to accept inputs from the HA model. Definition 1. A Labeled Pushdown System (LPDS ) is a tuple (I, G, Γ, Δ, g 0 , ω 0 ), where I is a finite input alphabet, G is a finite set of global states, Γ is a finite stack alphabet,
is a finite set of transition rules, and g 0 , ω 0 ) is the initial configuration. An LPDA rule is written as g,
For co-verification, we define: (1) the input alphabet of LPDS , I, as the power set of the set of atomic propositions that may hold on a state of HA; (2) the alphabet of HA, lab, as the power set of the set of atomic propositions that may hold on a state of LPDS ; and (3) two synchronization labeling functions as follows:
• L P2H : (G × Γ) → lab, which associates the head of an LPDA configuration with the set of propositions that hold on it; • L H2P : V → I, which associates a state of HA with the set of propositions that hold on it. Since the state transitions of both the LPDS and HA are labeled by the symbols, the two models are synchronized. It is further desired that a unifying model is built to combine them; thus, their behaviors can be analyzed together as an integrated system. • (v 0 , g 0 ),x 0 , ω 0 ) is initial state of HAPS . The input alphabets I and lab are used to synchronize the LPDS rules and HA transitions. Once HAPS is constructed, these input alphabets are no longer useful. We will construct the whole system discrete transition by Algorithm 1. E and act are used to capture discrete transition of HA. Therefore, they are not in the definition of HAPS .
The
, ω while HA transitions and LPDS self-loops as modeled by (g, q), Υ − → (g, q ), Υ . 
Algorithm 1: GENERATE HAPS RULES
{LPDS transition and HA self-loops}
V. Constructing HAPS for Cyber-Physical System
In this section, we discuss how to construct a HAPS model. As illustrated in Fig. 5 , our formal framework has: software model, plant model and cyber/physical interface. There are three steps to construct a HAPS model from the software and plant model: (1) define the cyber/physical interface; (2) instrumenting the software model based on the cyber/physical interface; (3) instrumenting the plant model based on the cyber/physical interface. In order to facilitate the understanding of our approach, we illustrate it with the TableSat example. 
A. Cyber/Physical Interface
CPS contains both the physical components being controlled and the software implementation of control algorithms. The software controller and its control plant are mostly asynchronous and only transition synchronously when they interact through their interface. The cyber/physical concurrency describes such situations:
• Mostly, software and plant transition asynchronously, where their states do not affect each other; • When software and plant interact with each other, their synchronous transition will be decided by the states of both software and plant. The cyber/physical interface describes how software controller and its controlled plant should transition synchronously when they interact with each other. A cyber/physical interface has two parts: interface states and interface events. Interface states are state variables provided either by software or plant and accessible by both. Interface events have two types: software or plant. When software updates the plant interface states, a software interface event occurs, and vice versa. For example, when software writes command to the plant, the cyber/physical interface will set the related actuator accordingly. In general, the cyber/physical interface describes the synchronous transitions of software and plant when an interface event occurs.
Consider the example of TableSat (see Fig. 5 ). Interface states are system mode and physical data, which represent motion of fan (Eq. 3 or Eq. 4) and senor read value respectively. A plant discrete transition is a set of HA transitions labeled by the symbol from lab; and an atomic software statement is a set of LPDS rules labeled by the same input symbol from I. The input alphabet of software model is {ad} and {no event}; the lab of plant model is {da} and {no evt}. The labeling function L H2P (resp. L P2H ) maps plant (resp. software) states to input symbols in I (resp. lab). For HA, there are symbols such as {da}, {no evt} ∈ lab, where the propositional variable {da} represents the software interface events when software writes the command to set the related actuator; and the propositional variable {no evt} represents that there is no software interface event. On the other direction, for LPDS , there are input symbols such as {ad}, {no event} ∈ I, where the propositional variable {ad} represents the plant interface event, i.e., A/D conversion; and the propositional variable {no event} represents that there is no plant interface event. Fig. 6 illustrates an example of a software interface event function in response to a software read sensor value operation. The function ad convertion is labeled by the symbol, {ad} ∈ I. Conceptually, the software interface event happens, i.e., {ad} is evaluated true, when entry stack symbol of ad convertion is reached. When software writes command, plant should be switched in response to a software write actuator operation. Fig. 7 simulates this process. The function da convertion are labeled by {da} ∈ lab. Therefore, the plant discrete transition is enabled when software writes command. Figure 7 : An implementation of a plant interface event.
B. Instrumenting HA
The physical plant model describes the behaviors of physical dynamic when it transitions asynchronously with software, i.e., when there is no D/A conversion. There are two steps to construct a HA model: first, we instrumenting the plant model based on the cyber/physical interface, which adds the synchronization label imposed by HAPS . Second, we convert hybrid automata into an equivalent C program.
We utilize SMT to abstract the physical plant and serve as the semantic foundation for abstraction.
In the following, we describe the encoding of a HA with disjoint sets of continuous variables. The HA = (x,x 0 , V, v 0 , inv, di f, E, act, syn, lab) , where
•x is encoded as global variables.
• V is encoded with a set of module functions.
• Initial state is given by the initialization function;
• inv is encoded with a set of inequalities over data variables in a module function; • The continuous variables evolve according to di f , which is defined within a module function.
• E is encoded with the function call. E entry and E exit are the function entry and function exit, respectively. E entry determines when HA performs a continuous evolution, while E exit determines when HA stutters (i.e. no transition). The E entry is chosen when the value of data variables satisfies act(e), e ∈ E; • act is encoded with a set of inequalities over data variables; • Synchronization constraint, lab, is encoded with a set of boolean variables; • syn is encoded with a set of equalities over boolean variables. Take TableSat as a example. We convert its plant model (Fig. 4) into a C program (Fig. 8) . The code in Fig. 8 works as follows:
Lines 1: Defines three float variables physical, nu and t, which represent three continuous states (ω, v, t).
Line 3: Realizes Eq. 1 and Eq. 3 during the time interval TimeInterval. Here we use Euler method to solve ordinary differential equations with a given initial value.
Line 5-29: Models the state transitions for TableSat when the plant executes asynchronously with the controller. During each execution of the transaction function, the motion of TableSat is selected by the controller through interface state system mode (Line 7 and 25). So only one module executes and its related state variables will be update. Line 8, 16, 20 : Checks whether the value of time variable t satisfies act(e).
line 11, 17, 21: Executes plant dynamic by calling function physcial dynamic1 or physcial dynamic2.
C. Instrumenting Software
The software model describes the behaviors of the controller when it transitions asynchronously with the physical plant, i.e., when there is no sampling. It describes the desired operation sequences for the controller to control the plant. The left side of Fig. 9 shows the skeleton of the control software for TableSat. When initializing the controller, the software will set a timer to invoke the control loop periodically. After that, the controller will wait to invoke the main control loop. In the control loop, the controller first reads senor values from the channels, then calculates Given the cyber/physical interface, plant model, and software, we combine them into a C program. After software functions (wait clock, calculate output and command motor), we invoke the plant transaction function, physical run, to let the asynchronous plant model execute.
VI. Verification Algorithm for Cyber-Physical System

A. Bounded Model Checking of Safety Properties of HAPS
In order to verify CPS, it is necessary to specify properties to be be checked, i.e., whether the implementation of CPS design may exhibit behaviors that satisfy certain conditions, specifying some desired or undesired interactions among the components. Events in CPS are basically boolean propositions over physical variables. Assertions are desired correlations among physical plant and software events.
In our co-verification framework, the formal model is a HAPS and the property φ are specified using assertions. When a safety property is specified, we check properties of the form AG φ through reachability analysis. Fig. 10 shows the co-verification flow as supported by our approach. We convert a HAPS into a C program, which we refer to as the verification model, so that model checkers for C can be readily utilized. The backend engine, CBMC [18] , checks the safety properties on the C program. The CBMC can directly reason about floating point arithmetic by bitblasting, following the IEEE 754 standard.
B. Symbolic Execution
Bounded Model Checking (BMC) is a technique that finds a violation of a property φ in a transition system. Thus, BMC finds a violation state for φ if there is a path which witnesses the violation in at most k steps. x i (i ∈ [0, k]) represents the configuration of HAPS in step k. In this paper, we express that violation state will be reached within k-step execution as
As we discussed in section III-A, temporal determinism is very important for system design. Designers normally assume equidistant sampling and negligible or constant latency. However, this situation can rarely be achieved in practice. To circumvent the theoretically difficult temporal determinism problem, we defined the latency as a symbolic variable: instead of asking whether a system is safe or not by a precise latency, a symbolic variable asks whether a system is safe or not within a loose bound. The symbolic variable is a bounded interval [m, n] = {r ∈ R | m ≤ r ≤ n} (m, n ∈ R), which is a set of real numbers. Proposition 1 For a Hybrid Automata Pushdown System (HAPS ), suppose [HAPS ] k is a satisfiability formula encoded for k steps as described above. If [HAPS ] k is unsatisfiable, then HAPS is safe for k-step execution.
VII. Evaluation
To evaluate our proposed approach, especially the effectiveness of CPS verification, we conduct two case studies to evaluate its applicability to real-world control systems. In our case studies, we want to check whether the controller is safe or not with slight perturbations in the inputs and outputs to the system. All experiments were performed on a machine with 2.93GHz Intel(R) Xeon and 8G memory.
A. TableSat
We started by implementing the controller in C. Then, we synchronized the software and physical plant model and convert it into a C program. Fig. 11 shows a simulation run of TableSat. We formulated the properties of the system and its components, and conducted bounded model checking. Assertions are desired correlations among discrete computation and continuous control plant events. In summary, the behaviors of TableSat must comply with the following safety rules: Safety Rule 1: The controller never accelerates the TableSat over the rotary velocity limit VelocityU pBound. Formally, (Rotary.Velocity ≤ VelocityU pBound). Safety Rule 2: When running more than a threshold T imeBound, the controller will always accelerate the TableSat over the rotary velocity limit VelocityDownBound. 
B. Cruise Control System
The second experiment is cruise control system (see Fig. 12 ). Cruise control is an example of a feedback control system found in many modern vehicles. The purpose of the cruise control system is to automatically controls the speed of an vehicle. The driver sets the speed and the system takes over the throttle of the car to maintain the speed according to a control law. We obtain the car model from the benchmark of iSAT [19] .
The top-level diagram of the model shown in Fig. 12 is composed of a module which represents the vehicle dynamic, with an additional cruise control block to control the vehicle speed. The dynamics of the car consists of: the continuous speed variable v =ẋ (m · s −1 ), the continuous inputs that are the engine torque u t (Nm) and the braking force u b (N), plus six binary inputs g 1 , g 2 , g 3 , g 4 and g 5 ∈ {0, 1} corresponding to the selected gear.
1) Car Model:
The car model in the benchmark is the model of Renault Clio 1.9 dTi RXE. The dynamic motion Figure 12 : Cruise control system. equation of the car is as follows:
whereẍ is the vehicle accelerated speed, m is the vehicle mass, F e is the traction force, F b = u b is the braking force, F Υ is the friction force. F Υ = βv, where β is a constant that takes into account all the frictions. The traction force F e and engine speed ω can be written as F e = F e1 +F e2 +F e3 +F e4 +F e5 and ω = ω 1 +ω 2 +ω 3 +ω 4 +ω 5 , where
where R g (i) is the gear ratio corresponding to the ith gear, u t (Nm) is the engine torque, and k loss is the drive train efficiency level. The main parameters of the car are:
The controller commands throttle position, braking force and selected gear, based on the desired vehicle speed and measurements of the actual car speed and engine speed. It consists of three controllers: gear shift controller, torque PI controller and braking force PI controller.
The gear shift controller performs the function of gear selection in the automatic transmission. The automatic transmission adjusts gear ratios as the vehicle moves. Each gear is followed by different dynamic law (traction force and engine/vehicle speed). The model describes controls for a 5-speed transmission system. Fig. 13 illustrates the functionality.
The gear shift controller defines the input as the actual vehicle speed and the output as the desired gear number. Shifting is only possible between adjacent gears and is triggered when engine speed leaves a certain interval. If the engine speed is faster than up th (3500 RPM) then the gear is shifted up. Similarly, if the speed is lower than down th (1500 RPM), the gear is shifted down.
The throttle and the brakes are operated by the PI controller, which is characterized by:
where e(k) is integral error and Δv(k) is the difference between desired speed and actual vehicle speed.
3) Co-Verification of Cruise Control System: We applied our co-verification approach to the transmission shift control system with the same process as TableSat. We synchronized the software and physical plant model and converted it into a C program, formulated the properties of the system and its components, and then conducted bounded model checking.
We checked a safety property: the cruise controller will never accelerate the car over the speed limit. We used the following initial set {T = 3s, t i = 1.5s, t o = 2.1s} and specified a target speed 13.89m/s. We set sampling jitter ( j s ∈ [0, 0.1]) and input-output jitter ( j io ∈ [0, 0.2]) as symbolic variables. Bounded model checking thus revealed a simple bug of the controller that was, however, subtle enough not to be detected when designing the model: when the car speed near the speed limit (14.5m/s), instead of applying the maximum braking force, the controller still sets engine torque to 112.220001Nm, allowing the car to accelerate and exceed the speed limit. This happens since the controller re-computes the cruise control setting only every 3s with sampling jitter of 0.091578s and input-output jitter of 0.132955s. The error trace is shown in Table I . Each row in the table shows a system state at a time instant. For instance, the last row shows that the car speed has exceeded its speed limit at 7.5s with the set of parameters: selected gear = 1, engine torque = 112.220001Nm, and braking force = 0N. The verification run took 7242.26s.
VIII. Conclutions
This paper proposes an automata-theoretic approach to cyber/physical co-verification. The core of this approach is a formal model for co-verification, Hybrid Automata Pushdown System (HAPS ). We have demonstrated the process of constructing a HAPS from the software, plant, and the interface between cyber/physical through the synchronization of a PDS and a HA and converting it into a C program. So reachability analysis of C program algorithms can be readily utilized to analyze HAPS . We have implemented this approach in our co-verification tool and successfully applied it to co-verify real-world control systems. The evaluation has shown that HAPS is an effective model for co-verification and our approach has major potential in verifying CPS. Our work is an ongoing project. On one hand, we are continuously improving our algorithms to reduce verification complexity. On the other hand, we are currently extending the integration of numerical solving of ODEs in order to directly handle ODEs in the solver without numerical approximation. 
